This paper develops a new search model to explain the long tail e¤ect. Search targetibility or the quality of search is explicitly modeled. Consumers are searching for right products within right categories. Mainstream consumers are distinguished from long tail consumers in terms of the prevalence of consumer tastes in the population. We show that mainstream consumers enjoy higher utility and mainstream products are sold at lower prices. In the market equilibrium long tail consumers might be excluded. As search costs decrease or search targetibility increases, additional variety of goods catering to long tail consumers will be provided and the concentration of sales across di¤erent category of goods decreases. The e¤ects of a decrease in search costs or an increase in search targetibility on consumer utility, prices, and pro…ts depend on whether the type coverage increases. Decreases in search costs and increases in search targetibility have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects.
Introduction
The widespread usage of internet has dramatically changed the variety and the distribution of products o¤ered. On the one hand, the variety of goods on o¤er has been steadily increasing, with more and more niche products being o¤ered. On the other hand, the distribution of sales has become ‡atter, with niche products gaining more market shares. Anderson (2004 Anderson ( , 2006 Anderson ( , 2009 referred to this phenomenon as the "long tail." Speci…cally, in the book industry, from 2002 to 2007 the number of new titles grew almost 10% a year. Actually, the number of new titles in 2007 alone was more than those published throughout the 1970s. 1 Similar patterns are found in markets for music and DVDs. Rhapsody, an online music provider, has more downloads of the songs beyond its top 10,000 than those within its top 10,000. For video rental shops, "new release"movies usually account for a dominant share of revenue. However, for DVDStation, a company that allows consumers to search and reserve movies online, more than 50% their rental revenue come from titles that are not new releases. 2 One explanation for the long tail e¤ect is that Internet decreases the inventory costs. Due to space constraints, a brick-mortar store can only carry a limited amount of variety of goods. These logistical constraints are absent for online stores, so they can carry a much larger variety of goods. With more variety of goods available online, consumers can have access to the products of their preferred tastes and sales will spread more to niche products. However, this supply-side story of product availability does not tell the whole story. Several recent studies, Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) on online bookstores, Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) on clothing retailing industry, and Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008) on video industry, found that even after controlling for product availability, online sales still exhibit the long tail e¤ect relative to o-ine sales.
This paper presents a new model of search to provide an explanation for the long tail e¤ect. In particular, we explicitly model search targetibility or the quality of search, which enables us to distinguish decreases in search costs from increases in search targetibility, both caused by the widespread use of online search. We not only study how online search a¤ects the variety of goods o¤ered and the concentration of sales, but also study the e¤ects on consumer utility, price dispersion, and the distribution of …rms.
Speci…cally, consumers are of di¤erent types with distinctive tastes. A consumer of a particular type only demands a good of a corresponding type, which de…nes product categories. There is an exogenously given population of …rms, and each …rm can only choose to serve one type of consumers, or produce one category of goods. Within the right category, each consumer likes di¤erent …rms'products to di¤erent degrees, or a consumer's valuation about a particular …rm's product follows some distribution. 3 The distribution of consumer types are exogenously given. We call consumer types which have relatively large fractions of population as mainstream types, and those having relatively small fractions of population as long tail types. The timing is a follows. First, …rms simultaneously choose product category (which type of consumers to serve). Then, observing the type distribution of …rms, …rms simultaneously set their prices, and consumers conduct search and buy goods.
Consumers search sequentially. Before searching, each consumer has a targeted set of …rms, which consists of all the …rms of the right category (signal) and a certain fraction of …rms of irrelevant categories (noise). One can think that this targeted set is generated by some online search engines. Within the targeted set, consumers search randomly. With this formulation, consumers are not only searching for the right category of goods, but also searching for the right products within the right category. The optimal amount of search depends on the probability of …nding the right category. If the targeted set contains fewer …rms of irrelevant categories (the targetibility of search increases or the noise decreases), for each type of consumers the probability of …nding the right category increases. On the other hand, if there are more …rms serving a particular consumer type, then the probability of …nding the right category for that type is higher, as the signal to noise ratio in the targeted set is higher.
Given the set of consumer types covered, there is at most one equilibrium. In any equilibrium that covers more than two types, mainstream consumers enjoy higher utility and search more within the right category than long tail consumers. Moreover, there are more …rms serving mainstream types, …rms serving mainstream types charge lower prices and have higher sales per …rm than those serving long tail types. 4 Intuitively, given that there are more mainstream type consumers, more …rms will naturally serve mainstream types as they are potentially more pro…table. Now the probability of …nding the right category is higher for mainstream consumers, and they will search more within the right category. which leads to lower prices, as higher search intensity within the right category results in lower prices. Thus mainstream consumers enjoy higher utilities. Given that …rms serving mainstream consumers charge lower prices, the sales per …rm for those …rms are higher than those serving long tail consumers in order to restore the equal pro…t condition. 5 Due to the coordination feature of exclusion, there might be multiple equilibria with different sets of consumer types covered. To resolve the issue of multiple equilibria, we introduce a notion of stability by considering …rms'joint deviation in choosing the types of consumers to serve. We show that, given parameter values, there is a unique stable equilibrium, which we call market equilibrium. The market equilibrium must be of monotonic con…guration: if a consumer type is covered, then all the consumer types more mainstream than that type must be covered. Actually, the market equilibrium has the most types covered among all equilibria with monotonic con…gurations. In the market equilibrium some long tail types might be excluded. This is because to induce a particular type to search the probability of …nding the right category for that type must be big enough. If the population of that type is too small, hence can only accommodate too few …rms, then the probability of …nding the right category for that type will be too small and it is excluded in the market equilibrium.
When either the search costs decrease or the search targetibility increases, (weakly) more long tail consumer types will be covered in the market equilibrium, leading to (weakly) more variety of goods o¤ered and lower concentration of sales across types. The underlying reason is that both changes increase consumers'incentive to search. This provides an explanation for the long tail e¤ect. When the consumer coverage does not increase, both changes will lead to lower prices, lower pro…ts, and higher utility for each covered consumer type. This is due to the fact that increased search intensity within the right category intensi…es competition among …rms. When the consumer coverage does increase, the e¤ects of both changes on pro…ts and consumer utilities are ambiguous. This is because increased type coverage will decrease each consumer type's probability of …nding the right category, as …rms are spreading over more types. In some sense, more type coverage softens competition among …rms. This e¤ect tends to increase prices and pro…ts and decrease utilities for consumers. As a result, the overall e¤ects are ambiguous.
Decreases in search costs and increases in search targetibility have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects. First, while a decrease in search costs always induces consumers to conduct more overall search, an increase in search targetibility might lead to less overall search. Second, an increase in search targetibility tends to reduce the di¤erence between mainstream consumers and long tail consumers, as the probabilities of …nding the right category become more equalized among consumers. It is not clear whether a decrease in search costs always has a similar e¤ect. When consumers'match value is uniformly distributed, we show that decreases in search costs and increases in search targetibility have distinctive (sometimes opposite) e¤ects on consumers' overall amount of search, the distribution of prices, and the distribution of …rms across types.
Finally, in an extension we incorporate free entry of …rms. While most of the results in the basic model hold qualitatively with free entry, some results depend on whether the measure of irrelevant …rms in the targeted set (noise) increases with the measure of active …rms in the market. In general, with free entry the e¤ects of changes in search costs and search targetibility are dampened, as the measure of active …rms will endogenously adjust, which tends to partially o¤set the e¤ects of the initial changes.
There is a big literature on consumers searching for prices among …rms o¤ering homogenous goods, e.g. the non-sequential search model of Varian (1980) and the sequential search model of Stahl (1989) . This paper is more related to the literature on searching for variety of goods. Wolinsky (1986) is the …rst model that studies consumers searching for right products among heterogenous goods. Anderson and Renault (1999) show that the monopoly pricing result of the Diamond (1971) model and the marginal cost pricing result of the Bertrand competition are the two limiting cases of Wolinsky's model. In those models, consumers are ex ante identical and …rms are symmetric; hence there is no issue of search targetibility. In our model, consumers are of di¤erent types and di¤erent …rms might choose to serve di¤erent consumer types. This allows us to model search targetibility and address the long tail e¤ect.
Bar-Isaac et al. (2010) provide a search model with endogenous product design to explain the long tail e¤ect and the super star phenomenon. 6 In their model, …rms are vertically di¤erentiated or of di¤erent qualities. Firms choose prices and product design, which ranges from broad market designs that appeal to all consumers to some average extent to more niche designs that are very appealing to some consumers but very unattractive to other consumers. In equilibrium, higher quality …rms choose the most broad design and lower quality …rms choose the most niche design. As consumers' search costs decrease, more …rms choose niche designs. In their model, the increase in variety of goods o¤ered is embodied in more …rms choosing niche designs, while in our model it is re ‡ected in more long tail types of consumers covered (or goods o¤ered).
Hervas-Drane (2010) considers how online recommendation systems a¤ect sales distribution in a search model. He shows that the presence of a general recommendation system tends to increase sales concentration, while a personalized recommendation systems tends to reduce it. In his model, search is either completely random (no recommendation) or not needed (with recommendation). 78 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 analyzes consumers'search behavior and …rms'pricing behavior. In Section 4 we characterize equilibria and establishes the existence and uniqueness of stable equilibrium. Section 5 studies comparative statics about the market equilibrium and shows that decreases in search costs and increases in search targetibility lead to di¤erent e¤ects. Section 6 incorporates free entry and Section 7 concludes.
Basic Model
There is a continuum of consumers with total measure m, and each consumer has a unit demand. On the producers'side, there is a continuum of risk-neutral …rms with total measure 1. Each …rm produces a single product and the marginal cost of production is normalized to 0. Consumers are of N 2 types, labeled as t 1 , t 2 , ..., t N . Consumers of di¤erent types have distinctive tastes. The proportion of type t n consumers is n , with N X n=1 n = 1. We assume that n is strictly decreasing in n, that is, 1 > 2 ::: > N . With this formulation, as n increases, type t n consumers become gradually from popular types (mainstream consumers) 6 The super star phnomenon referes to the scenario that most popular products gain market shares. 7 Other di¤erences are that, while in his model there is only a monopolist …rm and the variety of goods o¤ered is exogenously given, in our model we have competing …rms and the variety of goods o¤ered (the equilibrium coverage of consumer types) is endogenous. 8 A recent paper by Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) studies the e¤ects of targeted advertising on media markets.
to less popular types (long tail consumers). The distribution of consumer types is common knowledge. Each …rm has to decide which type of consumers to serve by making its product catering to one particular type of consumers, and it can at most serve one type of consumers. A …rm serving type t n consumers is labeled as type T n . We assume that consumers know their own types, but …rms cannot observe consumers'type who visit them. The above assumptions imply that consumers know whether they are mainstream consumers or long tail consumers.
Consumers have to search for products. We assume that each consumer searches sequentially, with per search cost s > 0. If a consumer searches M times, he incurs total search cost of M s. If a consumer l of type t i buys from …rm k of type T j , then his gross utility (net of search costs) is
where p k is the price charged by …rm k, and " lk is the match value between consumer l and …rm k. The random variable " lk has a density function f ("), cumulative distribution function F ("), and support [a; b], with b > a > 0. We assume the density function f is log concave, which is standard in the literature. Moreover, " lk is i.i.d across consumers and …rms. In the formulation of consumers'preferences (1), a type t n consumer derives positive utility only if he buys from a T n …rm, and he derives 0 utility if he buys from a T j …rm with j 6 = n. Moreover, there is variations of the match value between a t n type consumer and a T n …rm, which is captured by the term " lk . The interpretation of the underlying preference is as follows. Di¤erent types of consumers demand goods of di¤erent categories and a particular type of consumers only derives positive utility from goods of a particular category. Among the …rms that provide the right category of goods to a particular consumer, the degree to which the consumer likes the products varies across …rms. To illustrate the idea, we use books (novels) as an example. At the category level, some consumers only want to read detective stories (DS) and some consumers only want science …ctions (SF). This distinction de…nes two consumer types: the type of DS and the type of SF. At the book (…rm) level, a particular consumer of type, say, DS, likes di¤erent DS books to di¤erent degrees. To summarize, the type of a consumer de…nes the category of goods that he wants, and there is no substitution among di¤erent categories. Within the right category, consumers of the same type still have di¤erent tastes regarding di¤erent …rms' products. As a result, consumers are not only searching for the right category of goods, but also searching for the right products within the right category.
Let n be the fraction of type T n …rms, and p n be the price (or a price distribution) charged by type T n …rms. The timing is as follows. In the …rst stage, …rms simultaneously determine their types by choosing which types of consumers to serve. In the second stage, the type distribution of …rms, f n g, becomes publicly known. Then …rms simultaneously choose the prices fp n g. Finally, rationally anticipating …rms' prices, consumers conduct search and buying goods.
Consumers' search are not be completely random. Denote n as a type t n consumer's probability of encountering a type T n …rm in each search. In particular, we assume that
where > 0 is a constant with the restriction that n + 1 for all n. The underlying rationale of (2) is as follows. Before conducting search, a type t n consumer has a targeted set of …rms, and then searches randomly among the …rms in the targeted set. In particular, the targeted set of …rms include all the …rms of the right category (all type T n …rms), and some …rms of the other categories with measure . We can reasonably think that the targeted set of …rms is generated by the technology of the internet. In the example of novels, with internet search engines a DS type consumer can type in the keyword Detective Stories, then he will be directed to all detective stories plus some novels of other categories. The term captures how re…ned the targeted set is, or the targetibility of search. A bigger means that the targeted set includes more …rms of irrelevant categories, thus search has a lower targetibility. On the other hand, a smaller implies higher targetibility of search. Note that if = 0, then for all consumers the probability of …nding the right category, n , becomes 1. That is, search becomes completely targeted. In the other extreme, if n + is always 1, then the targeted set includes all …rms and search becomes completely random. As decreases, n increases. From the formulation of (2), we see that as n increases, n increases as well. Given that the targeted set always has the same measure of …rms of irrelevant categories, an increase in the fraction of the …rms of the right category would increase the chance of hitting a …rm of the right category. 910 We will focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that …rms of the same type will charge the same price. In other words, p n is degenerate. 9 Using an analogy, an increase in n means that the signal to noise ratio, n = , increases. Hence search is more likely to hit the relevant category.
1 0 An alternative way to model search targetibility is as follows:
where 2 (0; 1]. That is, the targeted set includes proportion of …rms of the right category, and irrelevant …rms of measure . Keeping constant, search targetibility can be captured by the parameter . As increases, n increases, or the targetibility of search increases. In this formulation, n is increasing in n as well. The main results of this paper hold qualitatively under this alternative formulation.
Search and Price

Consumers'search behavior
Suppose …rms' type distribution is f n g and consumers expect that the prices charged are fp n g. Consider a type t n consumer whose current utility is u n if he stops searching. Now suppose he samples one more …rm. With probability n the new …rm is a T n type …rm, and the consumer will prefer the new product if " p n u n , with a utility gain " (u n + p n ). With probability 1 n , he encounters a …rm not of type T n and earns nothing. Therefore, the expected gain from one additional search is:
Searching one more …rm is worthwhile if and only if the expected search gain is bigger than the search cost s. Or equivalently, a t n type consumer will stop searching if and only if u n u n , where u n , the reservation utility for type t n , is implicitly de…ned as
De…ne b x n u n +p n . Now (4) can be rewritten compactly as n g(b x n ) = s. We can interpret b x n as type t n consumers'reservation match value (in terms of "). From (3), we can see that g(x) is strictly decreasing in x. Thus, there is at most one b
x n (at most one u n given p n ) satisfying (4).
Lemma 1 (i) The reservation match value, b
x n , is increasing in n , increasing in n , and decreasing in ; (ii) if n is close enough to 0, then type t n consumers will not search.
Proof. As n increases, by (4) g(b x n ) must decrease. Given that g(x) is strictly decreasing in x, b
x n must increase. Since n is increasing in n and decreasing in , b x n is increasing in n and decreasing in . This proves part (i). To show part (ii), note that to induce consumers of type t n to search, u n must be positive. Given that p n 0, g(b x n ) has an upper bound E("), which is …nite. If n is close enough to 0, hence n is close to 0 (less than s=E(")), then there is no u n 0 satisfying (4) and type t n consumers will not search.
A bigger reservation match value, b x, means that consumers are more demanding in terms of stopping searching, hence the search intensity is higher, or search more on average within the right category. 11 According to Lemma 1, the search intensity (within the right category) 1 1 Overall, a higher reservation match value does not imply more search, even in expectation terms. This is because a bigger b xn is associated with a bigger n or n . A bigger b xn means that the consumer will search more within the right ctaegory, but a bigger n implies that the consumer is more likely to encounter …rms of right category. Thus whether a bigger n will lead to more overall search is ambiguous.
is increasing in the probability of …nding the …rms of the right category. This is because the expected gain from search is increasing in the probability of …nding …rms of the right category. If the probability of …nding the right category of …rms is low enough, consumers will not bother searching. As the targetibility of search increases ( decreases), all types of consumers will have higher probabilities of …nding the right category, and they will search more within the right category.
In general, a bigger n or n does not imply less overall search (in expectation). Although a bigger n implies that the consumer is more likely to encounter …rms of the right category in each search, it will lead to a higher reservation match value b
x n , which means that the consumer will search more within the right category. Thus whether a bigger n will lead to more overall search is ambiguous. To see this more clearly, let n be a type t n consumer's probability of buying after each round of search. The expected length of search for that type is simply 1= n . 12 Therefore, a smaller n implies more overall search (in expectation). In particular,
Since b x n is increasing in n , by (5) an increase in n leading to less overall search (an increase in n ) if and only if
However, the logconcavity of f (") cannot pin down whether
What we can show is that when f (") is uniformly distributed,
is decreasing in b x n , thus a higher n implies less overall search. When
is constant, and the amount of overall search is independent of n .
Firms'Pricing behavior
Each …rm has two decisions to make: which type of consumers to serve by choosing type T n , and what price to charge by choosing p n . In this subsection we pin down type T n …rms' equilibrium price, p n .
For that purpose, we …rst derive a type T n …rm's demand whose price is p n , given that all other T n …rms charge p n and type t n consumers'reservation utility is u n . If a type t n consumer visits a T n …rm, he buys from this …rm if and only if " p n > u n . So the probability of purchase from the …rm in question is 1 F (u n + p n ). Given that all other type T n …rms charge p n , if a type t n consumer visits such a T n …rm, the probability of the consumer purchasing from that …rm is 1 F (u n + p n ) n . Now consider the …rm in question. In the …rst period, a number of m n n + type t n consumers visit the …rm. 13 After the …rst period, a measure of m n (1 n n ) type t n consumers do not stop searching. In the second period, a number of m n n + (1 n n ) type t n consumers will visit the …rm. By the same logic, in third period a number of m n n + (1 n n ) 2 type t n consumers will visit the …rm, and so on. Summing up all the visits, we derive the following demand for a T n …rm which charges p n :
with pro…t
Note that n does not depend on p n , the price charged by the …rm in question. The pro…t maximizing price p n is given by the …rst order condition:
Lemma 2 For each type n, (i) given n , the pro…t maximizing p n and consumers'reservation utilities u n are unique; (ii) p n is decreasing in b x n and u n is increasing in b x n ; (iii) p n is decreasing and u n is increasing in n , and p n is increasing and u n is decreasing in .
f (") is strictly decreasing in ". 14 This implies that, given b x n , there is a unique p n satisfying (8) and p n is decreasing in b x n . Since u n = b x n p n , u n is uniquely determined as well given b x n . By (4), b x n is uniquely determined given n . Therefore, p n and u n are uniquely determined given n . Moreover, u n is increasing in b x n . This proves part (i) and (ii). Part (iii) follows immediately from Lemma 1 and part (ii).
The result of Lemma 2 is intuitive. An increase in reservation match value means that consumers will search more within the right category, and with a log concave density function, each …rm's demand becomes more elastic. As a response, …rms' equilibrium price decreases. This tends to increase consumers'reservation utility. Since both an increase in the fraction of …rms of the right category ( n ) and an increase in search targetibility (a reduction in ) tend to increase consumers'reservation match value, both would lead to a decrease in equilibrium price and an increase in consumers'reservation utility.
Market Equilibrium
A market equilibrium is characterized by …rms'type distribution f n g, …rms'optimal prices fp n g, and consumers'reservation utilities fu n g such that:
(i) Given f n g and fp n g, for each type t n , type t n consumers' optimal search behavior leads to u n ;
(ii) Given consumer's optimal search behavior fu n g and …rms'type distribution f n g, the pro…t maximizing prices are fp n g.
(iii) In the …rst stage, given …rms' type distribution f n g, no …rm of any type T n has incentive to deviate to becoming another type.
Since consumers' search behavior depends on …rms' type distributions, there are many possible equilibria. Denote I = fn : n > 0g. That is, I is the set of consumer types that are served, which we call the inclusion set. In one extreme, I contains only a single element n. That is, all …rms choose to be type T n and only type t n consumers are served. We call such equilibria as pure exclusive T n equilibria. In the other extreme, I contains all N elements. That is, all n 's are strictly positive and all types of consumers are served. We call such equilibria as all inclusive equilibria. In between, I might contain at least two but not all elements. That is, more than two types of consumers are served but some type(s) of consumers are excluded. Denote an equilibrium associated with an inclusion set I as f I n g, fp I n g, and fu I n g for n 2 I.
Characterizing equilibria
We start by characterizing equilibria, assuming they exist. Consider an inclusion set I. For n 2 I, the expressions of …rm's pro…ts, (7), can be simpli…ed as:
By the analysis in the previous sections, equilibrium requirements (i) and (ii) can be explicitly written as (for n 2 I):
Regarding equilibrium requirement (iii), there are two kinds of deviations to worry about. First, any included type T n , n 2 I, should have no incentive to deviate to an excluded type T n 0 , n 0 = 2 I. This kind of deviation is clearly not pro…table. This is because a single …rm's deviation to type n 0 will not induce type t n 0 consumers to search, thus deviation will lead to zero pro…t, while a positive pro…t is guaranteed if a …rm remains as the current type T n . Second, any included type T n , n 2 I, should have no incentive to deviate to another included type T n 0 , n 0 2 I. To prevent this kind of deviations, all types of …rms that serve the included types of consumers should get the same pro…t. That is, for any n 2 I and n 0 2 I, n 6 = n 0 , in equilibrium the pro…t of a T n type …rm must equal to that of a T n 0 type …rm:
Proposition 1 (i) For any con…guration of I, there is at most one equilibrium. (ii) In the equilibrium with more than two types served (I contains more than two elements), I n is decreasing in n, p I n is increasing in n, u I n is decreasing in n, and the consumer to …rm ratio,
, is decreasing in n. That is, there are more …rms serving mainstream consumers, but there are less …rms per consumer for mainstream consumers; mainstream …rms serving mainstream consumers charge lower prices and have more sales than those serving long tail consumers; mainstream consumers enjoy higher utilities than long tail consumers.
Proof. Note that given f n g, and hence f n g, by Lemma 1 fb x n g are uniquely determined, and fp n g and fu n g are uniquely determined following Lemma 2. Therefore, to show the uniqueness of equilibrium for any I, we only need to show the uniqueness of f n g in equilibrium. First consider the case that I only contains a single element n (pure exclusive T n equilibria). With this con…guration, n = 1. It is obvious that the equilibrium is unique. Next consider the case that I contains more than two elements. Suppose, with inclusion set I, f I n g is an equilibrium distribution of …rms' types, and f Now consider the equilibrium with an inclusion set I containing more than two elements. Let n 2 I, n 0 2 I, and n 0 > n. We …rst show that n 0 . Since n > n 0 , by the equal pro…t condition (11) we must have p I n < p I n 0 . By Lemma 1,
Since, by Lemma 2, p I n is decreasing in b x I n , it follows that p I n p I n 0 . Thus we got the requisite contradiction, and
n is decreasing in b x I n , it follows that p I n < p I n 0 . Given that p I n < p I n 0 , by the equal pro…t condition (11) we must have
. Finally, since by Lemma 2, p I n is decreasing in u I n , p I n < p I n 0 implies that u I n > u I n 0 . This proves part (ii). The intuition for part (ii) of Proposition 1 is as follows. Suppose there are more …rms serving a long tail type consumers than those serving a mainstream type. To abuse terminology, we call …rms serving the mainstream consumers as mainstream …rms and those serving the long tail type as long tail …rms. On the one hand, mainstream …rms have more sales per …rm than long tail …rms. On the other hand, the long tail type of consumers will search more than the mainstream type, and thus mainstream …rms can charge a higher price than long tail …rms do. Combining these two e¤ects, mainstream …rms will earn a strictly higher pro…t than long tail …rms, which violates the equal pro…t condition and cannot be equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium there must be more …rms serving the mainstream type than those serving the long tail type. Given that there are more mainstream …rms, mainstream consumers will search more (within the right category) than long tail consumers, leading to a lower price charged by mainstream …rms. Now to restore the equal pro…t condition, mainstream …rms must have higher sales per …rm than long tail …rms.
Proposition 1 shows that, among the types served, mainstream consumers always enjoy higher utility than long tail types do. In other words, mainstream consumers are better o¤ simply by the fact that their tastes are shared by more people, and long tail consumers su¤er simply by the fact their tastes are shared by fewer people. In particular, the bene…t of mainstream consumers come from two sources: it is easier for them to …nd …rms of the right category, and those …rms charge a relatively lower price. Another interesting feature is regarding the distribution of …rms. Among the covered types, although there are more …rms serving mainstream types, compared to the distribution of consumer types the distribution of …rms is skewed toward long tail types, as each long tail consumer brings a higher pro…t (price) than a mainstream consumer does. 15 
The existence of equilibrium and equilibrium selection
For an equilibrium with con…guration I to exist, all the included types of consumers must have incentives to search. More formally, in an equilibrium with con…guration I, for all n 2 I, u I n 0. To ensure that some equilibrium exists, we make the following assumption: if a type t n consumer encounters a T n …rm with probability 1 in each search, then he has incentive to search. This assumption ensures that pure exclusive equilibria exist. More formally, De…ne
Note that h(x) is strictly increasing in x. Let b x be such that g(b x) = s. We assume the following condition holds throughout the paper:
Note that condition (12) is satis…ed if the search cost s is small enough. Given that assumption (12) holds, there are de…nitely multiple equilibria. In particular, all pure exclusive equilibria exist. To see this, assumption (12) ensures that type t n consumers have incentive to search in the T n pure exclusive equilibrium. 16 Since there is no …rms other than the T n type, all the other types of consumers will not search. And this means that each individual …rm has no incentive to deviate to other types. Thus any T n pure exclusive equilibrium exists. A generalization of the above logic is that, once a particular type t n of consumers is excluded, we do not need to worry about t n type consumers'deviation to searching and …rms'deviation to becoming T n type, since to make such deviations pro…table requires joint deviations of …rms and consumers. This self-con…rming feature of exclusion naturally leads to the multiplicity of equilibria.
The above discussion shows that an equilibrium with con…guration I exists if and only if for all n 2 I, u I n 0. Since, by Proposition 1, u I n is decreasing in n, the existence of equilibrium boils down to the condition that the least mainstream type covered has an incentive to search, or u I n 0, where n is the large element that belongs to I. Let z be the number of elements in I, or the number of consumer types served. Note that z 2 f1; 2; :::; N g. For pure exclusive equilibria, z = 1, and for the all inclusive equilibrium, z = N . For 1 < z < N , there are more than one possible con…gurations of I that have the same z. Among the possible con…gurations, we are interested in one particular con…guration.
De…nition 1 A con…guration I is said to be monotonic if n 2 I implies that, for any n 0 such that 1 n 0 < n, n 0 2 I. A monotonic con…guration I that contains z elements is called a z-monotonic con…guration.
In monotonic con…gurations, (relatively) mainstream types are covered and (relatively) long tail types are excluded. In a z-monotonic con…guration all the …rst z mainstream types of consumers are served, while the last N z (long tail) types are excluded. Note that the T 1 pure exclusive equilibrium has the 1-monotonic con…guration, and the all inclusive equilibrium has the N -monotonic con…guration. Moreover, given z, there is a unique z-monotonic con…guration. 1 6 By the de…nition of h(x), u I n (b x) = h(b x) in Tn pure exclusive equilibrium.
The next Lemma shows that, compared to non-monotonic con…gurations, …rms have higher pro…ts in equilibria with monotonic con…gurations.
Lemma 4 For any 1 z < N , among all the con…gurations having the same z, …rms'pro…ts are highest in the equilibrium of z-monotonic con…guration.
To understand Lemma 4, notice that monotonic con…gurations always include the most popular (mainstream) types of consumers. This implies that …rms can spread out relatively evenly across included types under monotonic con…gurations. Since some relatively less popular (long tail) types of consumers are included in non-monotonic con…gurations, …rms'type distribution will skewed toward more popular types, as the segments of less popular types can accommodate fewer …rms. With more …rms congested among popular types, those …rms have lower sales per …rm and popular consumer types will search more within the right category, both leading to lower pro…ts.
To resolve the issue of multiple equilibria, we have to impose some equilibrium selection criterion. One natural criterion is to select the equilibrium with the highest pro…t for …rms. The rationale is that …rms will most likely to coordinate on the equilibrium with highest pro…ts. The result of Lemma 4 suggests that, with such a criterion, an equilibrium with monotonic con…guration will always be selected. However, this is not true for the following reason. To maximize pro…ts, …rms have two tendencies. First, they try to cover as many consumers as possible, since doing that can increase sales per …rm. This means that mainstream consumers are more likely to be covered. Second, …x the total measure of consumers covered, …rms tend to cover as many types as possible. By spreading over more types (segments), in each covered segment consumers will search less and …rms can charge higher prices. In some sense, spreading over more segments increases product di¤erentiation and softens competition. This tendency implies that mainstream consumers may not be necessarily covered. To see this, note that it is possible that a z-monotonic equilibrium does not exist, but an equilibrium with a nonmonotonic con…guration which has z elements exists. This is because, generally, including a more mainstream type would cause the distribution of …rms skewed more toward mainstream types, leaving fewer …rms covering the long tail types, which discourages long tail consumers from searching. Therefore, given parameter values, it is possible that the equilibrium with highest pro…ts among all equilibria has a non-monotonic con…guration. 1718 As mentioned before, the model has the ‡avor of coordination games due to the selfcon…rming feature of exclusion. To select a reasonable equilibrium, we have to resort to joint (or coordinated) deviations. Speci…cally, we introduce the concept of stability.
De…nition 2 An equilibrium with …rm distribution f n g is said to be stable if, for any n, any joint deviation to type T n by any measure of …rms which are currently not of type T n is not pro…table.
For an equilibrium with more than two included types, to check whether it is stable we do not need to worry about the deviations to already included types, since such deviations will not be pro…table. This is because deviating to an already included type will reduce sales per …rm and the price of that type (due to more search of that consumer type), leading to lower pro…ts than what deviating …rms can get by remaining as the original types. Therefore, we only need to worry about deviating to the excluded types.
Later on we will show that equilibria with non-monotonic con…gurations are not stable. This implies that we can focus on equilibria with monotonic con…gurations. Before discussing the stability of equilibria, we …rst analyze equilibria of monotonic con…gurations. In the subsequent notation, a superscript z denotes a z-monotonic con…guration.
Proposition 2 (i) Firms' pro…ts in the equilibrium of z-monotonic con…guration,
z , is increasing in z.
(ii) For n z, p z n is increasing in z, and both z n , u z n are decreasing in z; both z z , u z z are decreasing in z. That is, for the mainstream types that are already covered, including more types lead to higher prices and fewer …rms serving those types.
Proof. Part (i). Consider a z-monotonic con…guration, and a (z +1)-monotonic con…guration, with 1 z < N . Since 
Therefore, by the equal pro…t condition, all …rms have a higher pro…t in the equilibrium of (z + 1)-monotonic con…guration.
Part (ii). By the results in part (i), for any n z, we have . The results of Proposition 2 are intuitive. Including one more type means that fewer …rms will be serving the previously included types, as some …rms switch to serving the newly included type. This leads to two e¤ects. First, sales per …rm would increase. Second, for the previously is not di¢ cult to see that the equilibrium with only type 2 and 3 being covered yields a higher pro…t for …rms than the equilibrium covering only type 1. included types of consumers, the probability of …nding the right category of …rms decreases. As a result, they will search less intensively within the right category and …rms now can charge higher prices. Both e¤ects tend to increase …rms' pro…ts. The second e¤ect also makes the previously included types of consumers worse o¤.
Proposition 3 Given parameter values, (i) any equilibrium with non-monotonic con…gura-tions is not stable; (ii) there is a unique stable equilibrium, which is the monotonic equilibrium with the biggest z; such z is determined by z z b and
The underlying reason for non-monotonic equilibria being not stable is that mainstream types are more pro…table for …rms. Monotonic equilibria with the number of types covered less than z is not stable because covering more types tends to increase …rms' pro…ts. The monotonic equilibrium with the largest number of types covered is stable because no more types can be possibly covered. More speci…cally, the measure of each remaining long tail type is so small such that a measure of b …rms deviating to becoming that type is not pro…table.
In the subsequent analysis, we will focus on the unique stable equilibrium, or the monotonic equilibrium with the largest number of types being covered. To abuse terminology, we will simply call it the market equilibrium. Note that long tail consumers might be excluded in the market equilibrium. The underlying reason is that search is not perfectly targeted. If there is only a few …rms serving a long tail type, the expected gain from searching is low as the probability of …nding the …rms of the right category is low. As a result, long tail consumers might simply do not search. Anticipating this, if the measure of a long tail type consumers is too low, …rms might just exclude that type.
Equilibrium Properties and Comparative Statics
Applying the results of Proposition 1, we conclude that the following properties hold in the market equilibrium. Among the …rst z mainstream types covered, prices are strictly increasing and consumers'reservation utilities are strictly decreasing as types move toward less mainstream types. 19 Moreover, among covered types, although more …rms are serving more mainstream types, the distribution of …rms is skewed toward less mainstream types relative to the distribution of consumer types.
The market equilibrium depends on the distribution of consumer types, f n g, search costs s, and the targetibility of search embodied in . In the rest of this section we will study comparative statics regarding the market equilibrium.
Consumer distribution
We …rst study how changes in consumer distribution, f n g, a¤ect the market equilibrium. (ii) Consider two distributions of consumer types, f n g and f 0 n g. Suppose in the market equilibrium under f n g z types are covered. Moreover, n 0 n for n < z and n 0 n for n z . In the market equilibrium under f 0 n g the number of types covered is less than or equal to z . z . Proposition 4 implies that as the proportions of long tail consumers decrease, or the type distribution becomes more skewed toward mainstream types, 20 in equilibrium more long tail types of consumers will be excluded. Intuitively, as the proportions of long tail consumers decrease, the long tail types can potentially accommodate fewer …rms. If the mass of the accommodated …rms falls below the critical mass b , the long tails types are simply excluded. 21 
Proof. Part (i). By Lemma 3 a monotonic equilibrium with z exists if and only if
The Long tail e¤ect
Now we study how changes in search costs and search targetibility a¤ect the market equilibrium, …xing the distribution of consumer types f n g. De…ne M n , n z , as the market share of the sales of type T n products in the market equilibrium. It can be readily shown that
. As the number of types covered, z , increases, all M n , n z , decreases. In other words, the concentration of sales across consumer types decreases as z increases.
Proposition 5
In the market equilibrium, if either the search costs s decrease, or the targetibility of search increases ( decreases), (i) the number of types of consumers covered, z , will (weakly) increase, and the concentration of sales will (weakly) decrease; (ii) if z remains 2 0 For a concrete example, consider the following family of distributions. For 2 n N , n = k n 1, where k 2 (0; 1). That is, the fraction of types decreases exponentially. As k decreases, the distrubution becomes more skewed toward maintream types. 2 1 When consumers' type distribution becomes more skewed toward mainstream types, its impact on …rms' pro…ts is ambiguous. On one hand, a decrease in the number of types covered tends to decrease pro…ts. On the other hand, an increase in the population of the most mainstream types tends to increase sales and pro…ts.
the same, then for all the previously covered types n z , both p n and n decrease and u n increases; (iii) if z increases, then it is possible that …rms'pro…ts increase and for all n z , p n increases and u n decreases.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 provides an explanation for the long tail e¤ect. As search costs decrease or the targetibility of search increases, more niche products (catering to long tail consumers) become available, some previously excluded long tail consumers start to participate in the market, and sales become less concentrated as they spread to newly provided niche products. The underlying reason is that both a decrease in search costs and an increase in search targetibility encourage consumers to search. As a result, the critical mass of …rms that is required to serve a particular type in order to induce search, b , decreases, which potentially leads to more types being covered in the market equilibrium.
Part (ii) of Proposition 5 shows that if the coverage of consumer types does not increase when search costs decrease or the targetibility of search increases (this is the case if the initial market equilibrium is already all inclusive), it will lead to lower prices, lower pro…ts, and higher consumer utilities for all the types already covered. This is because both changes encourage consumers to search more within the right category, which intensi…es competition among …rms.
However, when the coverage of consumer types does increase, there is an additional countervailing e¤ect. More types covered would soften competition by increasing product di¤er-entiation, and this e¤ect tends to increase …rms' pro…ts and lower consumer utilities. The overall e¤ect is ambiguous. In part (iii) of Proposition 5, we construct an example in which the second e¤ect dominates. This implies that a decrease in search costs or an increase in search targetibility may not always a blessing for consumers, especially when the magnitude of changes is small. In particular, when a small change of magnitude causes more long tail types being covered, while the newly covered long tail consumers are always better o¤, the previously covered mainstream consumers might be worse o¤, as some …rms switch to cover some previously excluded long tail types, which reduces mainstream consumers' chance of …nding their relevant categories of products. Nevertheless, when the change in magnitude is intermediate it is also possible that …rms' pro…ts and mainstream consumers' utilities both increase: the newly covered marginal types tend to increase the average sales for …rms, and this maybe more than compensating the pro…t loss resulting from lower prices among previously covered types.
Related to part (iii) of Proposition 5, the following two interesting and ironical phenomena could arise for previously covered consumers: a decrease in search costs could lead to less overall search, and an increase in search targetibility could lead to lower probabilities of …nding the relevant categories of products. The underlying reason is that the distribution of …rm types is endogenously determined, and the e¤ect of the induced change in …rm distribution could reverse the direct e¤ect of a reduction in search costs or an increase in search targetibility.
To illustrate the …rst phenomenon, recall that 1= n indicates the (expected) amount of overall search, where n is a type t n consumer's probability of buying after each round of search. Suppose the match value " is uniformly distributed. Now equation (5) in subsection 3.1 can be written more explicitly as
Now suppose s decreases slightly to s 0 and the type coverage is increased to z + 1. By part (iii) of Proposition 5, for any n z , 0 n < n . Thus 0 n < n . Following (13) and the fact that s ' s 0 , we have b x 0 n < b x n and 0 n > n . That is, under s 0 type t n consumers conduct less overall search. 22 The second phenomenon can be constructed in a similar fashion. 23 
The di¤erence between search costs and search targetibility
Now we study di¤erent e¤ects induced by a decrease in search costs and an increase in search targetibility. Roughly speaking, there are two major di¤erences. First, other things equal, while a decrease in search costs always tends to induce consumers to search more, an increase in search targetibility might induce consumers to search less overall. On the one hand, an increase in search targetibility makes consumers search more within the right category (b x n increases). On the other hand, consumers now have a high chance of hitting the right category. Therefore, the overall search could increase or decrease. Second, an increase in search targetibility tends to reduce the di¤erence between mainstream consumers and long tail consumers, as the probabilities of …nding the right category become more equalized among consumers. It is not clear whether a decrease in search costs always has a similar e¤ect.
To derive clear analytical results, in this subsection we assume that the match value, ", is uniformly distributed on [a; b]. With uniform distribution, the reservation match value and prices can be written explicitly as:
We say that the concentration of …rms decreases if for any two covered types n and n 0 , with n 0 > n, n = n 0 decreases. That is, …rms become more evenly distributed across types when the concentration of …rms decreases. Note that sales per …rm for type n is given by n = n . A 2 2 Another way to understand the results is as follows. De…ne the e¤ ective search costs of type tn consumers as s= n , the search costs devided by that type's probabibility of …nding the relevant category. When the type coverage z increases, for previously covered types n will decrease, as some …rms switch to cover some previously excluded types. This e¤ect tends to increase the e¤ective search costs, which will lower consumer utilities and discourage consumers from searching. 2 3 Speci…cally, an induced decrease in n is bigger relative to the initial decrease in such that n decreases.
decrease in concentration of …rms implies that sales per …rm becomes less evenly distributed across types, with the sales per …rm of …rms serving mainstream types increasing and that of …rms serving long tail types decreasing. 24 The next proposition shows that changes in search costs and changes in search targetibility have di¤erent e¤ects.
Proposition 6 Suppose the match value " is uniformly distributed on [a; b]. (i) Suppose the equilibrium type coverage, z , does not change. When the search costs decrease, all covered consumer types will search more overall, the ratios of prices between any two covered types will not change, and the distribution or the concentration of …rms will not change either. When the search targetibility increases, among covered types consumers will search less overall, the ratio of the price of any mainstream type to that of any relatively less mainstream type will increase, and the concentration of …rms will increase and sales per …rm will be more evenly distributed across types.
(ii) Suppose the equilibrium type coverage, z , increases. When the search costs decrease, the ratio of the price of any mainstream type to that of any relatively less mainstream type will decrease, and the concentration of …rms will decrease and sales per …rm will be less evenly distributed across types. The e¤ ects of an increase in search targetibility on price ratios and concentration of …rms are ambiguous.
The predictions of Proposition 6 can be potentially tested, which might enable us to empirically distinguish reductions in search costs from increases in search targetibility. To understand the results, …rst consider the case that the type coverage does not increase, which is certainly the case if the initial market equilibrium is already all inclusive. A reduction in search costs induces all covered types to search more. Thus all the prices decrease, but the ratios of prices across di¤erent types remain the same. 25 Thus the distribution and the concentration of …rms will not change. On the other hand, an increase in search targetibility increases all consumers' probability of …nding the right category. Although consumers' reservation match value will increase correspondingly, its impact on the expected length of search is dominated by the e¤ect of the initial increase in the probability of …nding the right category, leading to less overall search. In quantitative terms, an increase in search targetibility has bigger impact on long tail types. This is because a reduction in the noise would increase the signal to noise ratio more signi…cantly in percentage terms when the initial signal to noise ratio is low. As a result, although all the prices decrease, but the ratios of prices of mainstream types to those of long tail 2 4 Recall that, for covered types, the distribution of …rms is skewed more toward long tail types compared to the distribution of consumer types. A decrease in …rms'concentration means that the distribution of …rms becomes further away from the type distribution of consumers, or …rms become more evenly distributed across types. 2 5 The feature that price ratios do not change has to do with the uniform distribution of the match value. For general logconcave distributions, the price ratios will depend on the densities f (b xn) and f (b x n 0 ), which might change as both b xn and b x n 0 decreases. types increase as well (the price dispersion across types decreases). To restore the equal pro…t condition, some …rms will switch from serving long tail types to serving mainstream types, leading to an increase in the concentration of …rms and sales per …rm tend to be more equalized across types. In the extreme case of full targetibility ( = 0), in the market equilibrium all …rms charge the same price, all consumers receive the same utility, and the distribution of …rms exactly matches the distribution of consumer types. When the type coverage does increase, a reduction in search costs causes fewer …rms to serve the previously covered types. Other things equal, this tends to increase the di¤erence in the probabilities of …nding the right category across di¤erent types. This is because a reduction in the signal would reduce the signal to noise ratio more signi…cantly in percentage terms when the initial signal to noise ratio is low. This implies that the ratios of prices of mainstream types to those of long tail types will decrease. To restore the equal pro…t condition, the ratios of …rms serving mainstream types to those serving long tail types have to decrease, leading to a decrease in the concentration of …rms and sales per …rm tend to be less equalized across types. When the search targetibility increases, it has two e¤ects. On the one hand, it tends to reduce the di¤erence in the probabilities of …nding the right category across di¤erent types, the e¤ect we just mentioned in the last paragraph. On the other hand, an increase in type coverage tends to increase the di¤erence in the probabilities of …nding the right category across di¤erent types, an e¤ect spelled out at the beginning of the paragraph. These two e¤ects work against each other, and the resulting …rms'concentration can either increase or decrease.
While it is hard to derive clean analytical results for general distributions of the match value, we believe that a similar pattern regarding the di¤erent e¤ects of changes in search costs and changes in search targetibility holds more or less under more general distributions. This is because the following intuition is robust: an increase in search targetibility tends to reduce the di¤erence between mainstream consumers and long tail consumers, as the di¤erence in the probabilities of …nding the right category decreases, while a decrease in search costs in general does not have a similar e¤ect.
In the real world, the long tail e¤ect is more realistically caused jointly by reductions in search costs and increases in search targetibility. However, it is reasonable to think that internet technology has more impact on increasing search targetibility than on reducing search costs. Conceivably, it is easier for online technology to achieve full search targetibility than to reduce the search costs all the way to zero. 26 
Free entry
In this section we study the e¤ects of free entry. To incorporate free entry, we modify the …rst stage game. In particular, in the …rst stage …rms simultaneously make the following decisions: whether to enter and which type of consumers to serve if enters. Entry entails a sunk cost k.
Other aspects of the model are the same as the basic model. Denote the total measure of active …rms in the market as . Note that the consumer to …rm ratio is m= . Since in the basic model the total measure of …rms is exogenously …xed as 1, both f n g and can be interpreted as either fractions or measures. With the total measure of active …rms endogenously determined under free entry, whether the noise or the measure of irrelevant …rms, , will change with the measure of active …rms is crucial. We will study the following two di¤erent cases in turns:
is independent of , and increases with .
The noise is independent of the measure of active …rms
In this subsection, we study the case that is independent . We treat both f n g and as measures. The probability of …nding the right category can be written as
Observe that (15) is equivalent to (2), the expression of n in the basic model. 27 Given I, the set of types covered, = P n2I n . With free entry, we need to add one more equilibrium requirement: for any type belongs to the inclusion set, n 2 I, …rms should earn zero pro…t. More speci…cally, the equilibrium conditions can be written as:
where the …rst condition (16) is the zero-pro…t condition. By previous results, p n is strictly decreasing in n . Therefore, the equilibrium n is uniquely determined by the above three conditions, which does not depend on the distribution of …rms across other types. This is why we drop the superscript of I for the equilibrium n and p n . In some sense, with free entry only the relevant links will appear and full targetibility can be approximately achieved. 2 7 If we treat both f n g and as fractions, then n = n n + , which is di¤erent from (2), the expression of n in the basic model. Note that f n g and in (2) of the basic model can be inpterpreted as both measures and fractions. the linkage among the included types is loosened. To see this, note that in the basic model if the measure of …rms serving an included type changes, it necessary changes the measure of …rms serving another type, as the total measure of …rms is 1. This linkage or congestion e¤ect no longer exists under free entry. Instead, the measure of each type …rm is pinned down by the zero pro…t condition, and the measures of di¤erent included types can be determined independently.
Note that Proposition 1 is not a¤ected by free entry. But the conditions that guarantee the existence of equilibrium need to be modi…ed. For any included type, not only consumers should have incentive to search, but also …rms should earn non-negative pro…ts. Denote the equilibrium n as n , which solves (16)- (18). To ensure the existence of equilibrium, we assume the following condition holds:
which makes sure that the T 1 pure exclusive equilibrium exists. The following lemma characterizes the existence of equilibrium for any inclusion set I and shows that the unique stable equilibrium is the monotonic equilibrium with the largest number of types covered.
Lemma 5 (i) Let n be the largest element of I. An equilibrium with inclusion set I exists if and only if
(ii) Given parameter values, there is a unique stable equilibrium, which is the monotonic equilibrium with the biggest z; such z is determined by
The result of part (ii) of Lemma 5 is intuitive. With free entry, if some pro…table consumer type ( n b ) is excluded, then more …rms can enter jointly to cover that type. Therefore, the unique stable equilibrium is the monotonic equilibrium with the biggest type coverage. Again, we call the unique stable equilibrium as market equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (Free entry) In the market equilibrium, if either the search costs s decrease, or the targetibility of search increases ( decreases), (i) the number of types of consumers covered, z , will (weakly) increase, and the concentration of sales will (weakly) decrease; (ii) for all the previously covered types n z , both p n and n decrease and u n increases; (iii) the measure active …rms decreases if z remains the same, and it can either decrease or increase if z increases.
Part (i) of Proposition 7 shows that decreases in search costs or increases in search targetibility again give rise to the long tail e¤ect, as both encourage long tail consumers to search. Part (iii) shows that with free entry the measure of active …rms can either decrease or increase, an e¤ect absent from the basic model. Speci…cally, if the type coverage does not change, then the measure of active …rms will decrease under free entry. This is because intensi…ed search leads to lower prices and a lower gross pro…t, and the measure of …rms serving each type has to decrease to restore the zero pro…t condition. Although for covered types prices decrease and utilities increase, they are partially o¤set by the induced decrease in the measure of …rms of the right category. Another di¤erence is that with free entry each previously covered type always bene…ts from a decrease in search costs or an increase in search targetibility, while in the basic model that is not the case. The main reason is that with free entry covering a previously excluded type has no direct e¤ect on the measure of …rms serving the already covered types, as the measure of …rms serving each type is independently determined. However, with …xed measure of …rms covering a new type would reduce the measure of …rms serving the already covered types, which reduces consumer utility by reducing those types'probabilities of …nding the right category.
Regarding the results in Proposition 6 (the di¤erent e¤ects of changes in search costs and those of increases in search targetibility), it is not di¢ cult to see that they still hold qualitatively with free entry. This is because what drives the price ratios and concentration of …rms is the equal (gross) pro…t condition, which also holds under free entry.
The noise increases with the measure of active …rms
In this subsection we study the case that is increasing in . In general, the noise term could be written as ( ), with 0 < 0 ( ) 1. Here we will only consider the special case in which the noise term is , or the noise is always of a constant proportion to the total measure of active …rms. We focus on the special case for two reasons. First, it is easy to analyze. Second, the general case 0 ( ) 2 (0; 1) would yield similar qualitative results as the special case. Treating both f n g and as fractions, for the special case the probability of …nding …rms of the right category can be written as:
Observing (21), we see that the expression of n is the same as that in the basic model, and it is independent of . Therefore, all the previous results hold (except those regarding …rms' pro…ts). Moreover, the equilibrium measure of active …rms is (independent of other equilibrium features) determined by the free entry or zero pro…t condition. It is worth noting that part (iii) of Proposition 5 holds with free entry and increasing with : when the type coverage increases, a decrease in search costs (or an increase in search targetibility) might make consumers of previously covered types worse o¤. This is in contrast to the case with free entry and independent of . To understand this result, observe that when increases with the measure of active …rms, an increase in type coverage imposes a negative externality on already covered mainstream consumers, as the increased noise will reduce those consumers' probability of …nding …rms of the right category. On the other hand, when is independent of this externality is absent. In the basic model with …xed at 1, an increase in type coverage also imposes a negative externality on already covered mainstream consumers, but for a di¤erent reason: although the noise does not change, the probability of …nding …rms of the right category decreases since less …rms remain serving the mainstream types as some …rms switch to serving the newly covered types.
To study the e¤ect of changes in search costs or search targetibility on , consider an increase in search targetibility. If the equilibrium type coverage z does not change, it is not di¢ culty to see that the measure of active …rms must decrease in equilibrium. This is because by part (ii) of Proposition 5, if remains the same then prices and …rms' gross pro…ts will decrease. Thus must decrease to restore the zero pro…t condition. If the equilibrium type coverage z increases, whether will increase or decrease is not clear. These e¤ects are the same as those in part (iii) of .
Conclusion
This paper develops a new search model that incorporates search targetibility or quality of search. Consumers are searching for right products within right categories: di¤erent types of consumers demand di¤erent category of goods, and the same type of consumers have di¤erent preference among the products of the right category. Mainstream consumers are distinguished from long tail consumers in terms of the prevalence of consumer tastes (types) in the population. We show that mainstream consumers search more within the right categories and enjoy higher utility, mainstream products are sold at lower prices, and among the covered types the distribution of …rms are skewed more toward long types relative to the distribution of consumer types.
In the market equilibrium long tail consumers might be excluded. As search costs decrease or search targetibility increases, additional variety of goods catering to long tail consumers will be provided and the concentration of sales across di¤erent category of goods decreases. This provides an explanation for the long tail e¤ect. When the type coverage does not change, a decrease in search costs or an increase in search targetibility leads to lower pro…ts, lower prices, and high consumer utilities for all covered types. However, when the type coverage increases, the e¤ects of a decrease in search costs or an increase in search targetibility on prices, pro…ts, and consumer utilities are ambiguous. Decreases in search costs and increases in search targetibility have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects on consumers'overall search, the distribution of prices, and the distribution of …rms across types For simplicity, in the model we have assumed that each type of consumers only demands goods of the corresponding category. That is, there is no substitutability of goods across di¤erent types. In the real world, goods of di¤erent categories are more likely to be imperfect substitutes. For example, if a consumer who likes detective stories the most (a DS type) buy a science …ction (SF) book, his utility could still be potentially positive, though the utility is less than what he gets from buying a DS book. With the possibility of imperfect substitution across types, instead of being outrightly excluded long tail types might participate in the market and buy goods that are not of their preferred category. Following the example, a DS type might buy some SF book if it is very hard to …nd DS books but SF books are in abundance in the market. We leave this line of extension for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. Proof. First we show that it holds for z = 1. That is, in the T 1 pure exclusive equilibrium …rms' pro…ts are the highest among all pure exclusive equilibria. Consider the T 1 (with con…guration I 1 ) and T n (with con…guration I n ) pure exclusive equilibrium with n 2. From (10), we can clearly see that p 1 > m n p In n = In n . Next we show that it holds for 1 z < N . Consider the equilibrium of a con…guration I which has z elements and is not z-monotonic. Let i be the smallest n such that n = 0. Since I is not z-monotonic, i < z. Let j be the largest n such that n > i and n > 0. Now construct a new con…guration I 0 from I as follows: move j out of I and replace it with i, without changing other elements. Essentially, under I and I 0 the same z 1 types of consumers are served, and under I 0 a more mainstream type (i instead of j) is served. Note that if we repeat this process the new con…guration will eventually become z-monotonic. Now, what we need to show is that …rms gets a higher pro…t in the equilibrium with con…guration I 0 than that with con…guration I.
Denote the equilibrium distribution of …rm types under I and I 0 as f n g and f 0 n g, respectively. In the next step we show that j < 0 i . Suppose the opposite, j 0 i , is true. Now by Lemma 1 and 2, we have p j p 0 i . Given that i < j so that i > j , it follows that j = m (22), we see that it does not depend on search costs s. Given that z does not change, a decrease in s will not a¤ect the ratio n = n 0 . Therefore, a decrease in s will not a¤ect f n g or the concentration of …rms. This implies that f n g will not change either. By (14) , p n =p n 0 = p n 0 = n . Thus the price ratio p n =p n 0 will not change either. Recall that the expected length of search is 1= n , and n = n (1 F (b x n ) ). Since a decrease in s will not a¤ect n , but cause b x n to increase, n will decrease. Thus a decrease in s will induce more overall search for any covered type.
Suppose 0 < . We want to show 
Now the left hand side of (22) under 0 is strictly less than that under . This contradicts (22), by which they should equal to each other. Therefore, we must have Now the left hand side of (22) under s 0 is strictly greater than that under s. This contradicts (22), by which they should equal to each other. Therefore, we must have Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. (i). Recall from Lemma 3 that b b
x is the minimum reservation match value to induce consumers to search, and b is the corresponding minimum measure of …rms of the right category. For any n 2 I, if
then there is a n > b such that m n n p n = k. This is because by previous results p n is increasing in n , thus the gross pro…t n is decreasing in n . Note that the above condition is the most stringent for the largest n, n. Therefore, condition (20) is su¢ cient to ensure the equilibrium with inclusion set I exists.
(ii). First we show that any equilibrium with a non-monotonic con…guration I is not stable. Let n be the largest element in I. By (i), m k. Since I is non-monotonic, there is an i = 2 I and i < n. The fact that i > n implies that m
k. Now if exactly b measure of new …rms choose to be type T i …rms, type t i consumers will search and those …rms can earn a non-negative pro…t. Thus the equilibrium with con…guration I is not stable.
By similar logic, any equilibrium of monotonic con…guration with z < z is stable. This is because new …rms can pro…tably enter to serve type t z consumers. The z -monotonic equilibrium is stable because no more …rms can pro…tably enter and serve types less mainstream than type t z . x) = s. From the expression we can easily see that both a decrease in and a decrease in s will lead to a decrease in b , and potentially more types of consumers will be covered in the market equilibrium (following Lemma 5).
(ii). Suppose 0 < (the proof regarding a decrease in s is similar). We want show that 0 n < n . Suppose 0 n n . Combining with the fact that 0 < , by (18) b x 0 n > b x n , which by (17) implies that p 0 n < p n . Now from (16) we have 0 n < n , a contradiction to the fact that both should equal to k. Therefore, we must have 0 n < n . Now by (16) p 0 n < p n , which further implies that b x 0 n > b x n and u 0 n > u n by (17). (iii). If z remains the same, would decrease. This is because by (ii) 0 n < n for all n z . If z increases, then there are additional …rms entering into serving more long tail types, and the change in the total measure of active …rms is ambiguous.
